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Using national surveillance data for 120,111 human anthrax 
cases recorded during 1955-2014, we analyzed the tem-
poral, seasonal, geographic, and demographic distribution 
of this disease in China. After 1978, incidence decreased 
until 2013, when it reached a low of 0.014 cases/100,000 
population. The case-fatality rate, cumulatively 3.6% during 
the study period, has also decreased since 1990. Cases oc-
curred throughout the year, peaking in August. Geographic 
distribution decreased overall from west to east, but the 
cumulative number of affected counties increased during 
2005-2014. The disease has shifted from industrial to ag-
ricultural workers; 86.7% of cases occurred in farmers and 
herdsmen. Most (97.7%) reported cases were the cutane-
ous form. Although progress has been made in reducing in-
cidence, this study highlights areas that need improvement. 
Adequate laboratory diagnosis is lacking; only 7.6% of cas-
es received laboratory confirmation. Geographic expansion 
of the disease indicates that livestock control programs will 
be essential in eradicating anthrax.
Anthrax is an acute infectious zoonotic disease caused by the gram-positive, aerobic, nonmotile bacterium 
Bacillus anthracis, which can survive in soil for decades 
as an extremely resistant form (spores) (1). Herbivores be-
come infected when grazing on contaminated land, when 
bitten by Tabanid flies with contaminated mouthparts, or by 
ingesting contaminated feed (2). Naturally occurring hu-
man anthrax infections are caused by contact with infected 
animals or animal products; ingestion of undercooked in-
fected meat; or exposure to large-scale processing of con-
taminated hides, wool, and hair in enclosed factory areas 
(3). Injection anthrax has been observed in users of con-
taminated heroin in western Europe (4).
Although there has been a general decrease in the num-
ber of anthrax outbreaks in animal populations and in human 
cases, anthrax still has a nearly worldwide distribution, causes 
an estimated 20,000–100,000 cases annually, and poses a ma-
jor public health threat in regions of the Middle East, Africa, 
central Asia, South America, and Haiti (5). In addition, B. an-
thracis is always placed high on the list of potential agents 
with respect to biologic warfare and bioterrorism because 
of its robust nature and persistence of spores, the ability of 
aerosolized spores to readily infect by inhalation, and the high 
mortality rate for resultant anthrax cases (6). B. anthracis was 
used in this context in the anthrax letter events in the United 
States during 2001 and showed severe consequences (7).
Anthrax has probably been present in China for >5,000 
years as recorded in ancient Chinese medical books, but 
few reliable data were available before the People’s Repub-
lic of China was founded (8). Human anthrax was made a 
reportable disease in China during the 1950s. Over the past 
60 years, great progress has been made in control and pre-
vention, including development of human anthrax vaccine 
in China during the late 1950s and eradication of anthrax in 
industrial areas during the 1980s (8).
To our knowledge, no published literature systemati-
cally describes the epidemiology of human anthrax in Chi-
na. This study was conducted to observe temporal trends, 
seasonality, and geographic distribution of human anthrax 
in China during the past 60 years and demographic char-
acteristics during 2005–2014 to identify the current epide-
miologic situation and provide information for control and 
prevention of this disease.
Materials and Methods
National Surveillance Program
The national surveillance program of human anthrax is part 
of the Chinese Notifiable Disease Reporting System, which 
was started in the 1950s. During the 1950s–2003, aggre-
gated data for each province (a province in China is similar 
to a state in the United States) was reported monthly by 
mail to the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (China CDC). In 2004, a real-time online nationwide 
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reporting system was implemented. Since then, all human 
anthrax cases were required to be reported online <2 hours 
of diagnosis for inhalational anthrax and <24 hours of diag-
nosis for cutaneous and gastrointestinal anthrax.
Case Definition
All human anthrax cases, including probable and con-
firmed cases, were diagnosed according to the unified case 
definitions issued by the Chinese Ministry of Health. The 
diagnostic criteria for human anthrax cases changed twice 
during the study period, in 1998 and again in 2008 (online 
Technical Appendix Table, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/23/1/15-0947-Techapp1.pdf).
Before September 1998, a probable case was defined 
as a case with clinical manifestations and an appropriate 
epidemiologic history. A confirmed case was defined as a 
probable case plus laboratory evidence of B. anthracis in-
fection detected by bacterial isolation or demonstration of 
B. anthracis in a clinical specimen by microscopic exami-
nation of stained smears.
Since September 1998, a probable case has been de-
fined as a case with clinical manifestations and demonstra-
tion of B. anthracis in a clinical specimen by microscopic 
examination of stained smears. A confirmed case is defined 
as a case with clinical manifestations plus isolation of B. 
anthracis or a >4-fold increase in specific antibody titer 
against B. anthracis.
Epidemiologic history included living in areas with re-
ports of confirmed anthrax or having traveled to such plac-
es <14 days before onset or engaging in occupations that 
are likely to result in exposure to anthrax. The disease has 3 
clinical forms: cutaneous, inhalational and gastrointestinal. 
We have not detected injection anthrax in China.
Collection and Examination of Specimens
For every suspected anthrax case-patient, appropriate clini-
cal specimens were required to be collected before treat-
ment, including blood for all patients, vesicular fluid for 
patients with cutaneous anthrax, stools for patients with 
intestinal anthrax, and sputum or respiratory secretions 
for patients with inhalational anthrax. Every local CDC 
(county or prefecture) was required to examine stained 
smears of clinical specimens by microscopy. The presence 
of squared-ended, gram-positive, rod-shaped bacteria in 
chains was considered to be B. anthracis, and the corre-
sponding specimens were required to be delivered to the 
provincial CDC for further bacterial isolation, which was 
conducted in Biosafety Level 2 laboratories.
In accordance with national surveillance protocol for 
anthrax (9), bacterial isolation was conducted on nutrient 
agar plates. Specimen were sprayed on plates after pre-
processing, which included dilution or sedimentation and 
centrifugation, and heat-shocking. After incubation for 
8–24 hours at 37°C, plates were checked for medium sized 
bacterial colonies that were hoary and opaque and had a 
ground-glass–like surface. Phage and penicillin were used 
to test for sensitivity typical for B. anthracis. Because reli-
able commercial kits for antibody testing are not available, 
ELISA was rarely used to test for specific antibody against 
B. anthracis. Recently, PCR was also used to provide lab-
oratory evidence of B. anthracis infection. However, be-
cause there is no unified standard procedure for PCR of B. 
anthracis, PCR was also rarely used in laboratory analysis.
Demographic, Clinical, and Epidemiologic Data
Human anthrax surveillance data included data for 1955–
2014 of probable and confirmed cases for all 31 provinces 
in China. Aggregated data for cases and associated deaths 
by province and month were available for 1955–2003. 
During 2004–2014, each human anthrax case was report-
ed online through a standardized form that included basic 
demographic information (sex, date of birth, address); oc-
cupation; diagnosis classification (probable or confirmed); 
clinical form (cutaneous, inhalational, or gastrointestinal); 
outcome (survival or death); date of illness onset; and date 
of death (if applicable). National population data for China 
during 1955–2014 were obtained from the National Bureau 
of Statistics of China (10).
Data Analysis
We included in the analysis all probable and confirmed hu-
man anthrax cases with illness onset during 1955–2014. We 
calculated the annual incidence rate by dividing the number 
of human anthrax cases by the corresponding population at 
the end of a given year and the case-fatality rate by divid-
ing the number of human anthrax–associated deaths by the 
number of human anthrax cases with illness onset by the 
end of the same year.
We described spread and emergence of human anthrax 
during 2005–2014 with different kinds of affected coun-
ties as follows. A newly affected county this year was de-
fined as a county that reported human anthrax cases for the 
first time during that year since 2004, a previously affected 
county with a new case this year was defined as a county 
that reported human anthrax cases during and before that 
year since 2004, and a previously affected county without a 
new case this year was defined as a county that reported hu-
man anthrax cases before that year since 2004 but no case 
in that year. Any county reporting human anthrax cases 
since 2004 were designated as a previously affected county.
Descriptive statistics included frequency analyses for 
categorical variables, medians, and interquartile ranges for 
continuous variables. We used the χ2 test for testing differ-
ences of proportion for categorical variables. Probabilities 
were 2-tailed, and p values <0.05 were considered statis-
tically significant. We performed all analyses by using R 
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version 3.0.2 (https://www.r-project.org/) and used ArcGIS 
version 10.0 (ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA) to plot geograph-
ic distribution of cases.
Ethical Approval
This Chinese National Health and Family Planning Com-
mission (Beijing, China) determined that collection of data 
for human anthrax cases was part of a continuing public 
health surveillance. Thus, this study was exempt from in-
stitutional review board assessment.
Results
Temporal Trend and Seasonality
During 1955–2014, a total of 120,111 probable and con-
firmed human anthrax cases, including 4,341 fatal cases, 
were reported to the China CDC; the overall case-fatality 
rate was 3.6%. Before the 1980s, probable and confirmed 
human anthrax incidence showed a periodic increase and de-
crease every 8–10 years. There were 3 major peaks in 1957 
(0.54 cases/100,000 population), 1963 (0.65 cases/100,000 
population), and 1977–1978 (0.54 cases/100,000 popula-
tion). Thereafter, incidence decreased until 2013, when it 
reached a low of 193 cases (0.014 cases/100,000 popula-
tion) (Figure 1).
The case-fatality rate showed an overall downward 
trend before the 1980s and then increased to a high of 
13.0% in 1989, which was followed by a generally 
fluctuating decrease until 2014, when only 3 deaths were 
reported (Figure 1). Human anthrax cases occurred across 
the whole year, typically increasing in May, peaking in 
August (56% of cases occurred during July–September), 
and decreasing toward November. This pattern was con-
sistent during 1955–2014 (Figure 2).
Geographic Distribution
All 31 provinces had >1 probable or confirmed case of hu-
man anthrax during 1955–2014. The distribution of cases 
showed an overall decrease of cases from western to east-
ern China. From the end of 1970s onward, some large cit-
ies, such as Shanghai (1979), Beijing (1984), and Tian-
jin (1985), and some provinces in eastern China, such as 
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Figure 1. Cases of and 
deaths from probable and 
confirmed human anthrax, 
China, 1955–2014. A) No. 
human anthrax cases (n = 
120,111) and incidence rate 
(no. cases/100,000 population) 
by year. B) No. human anthrax 
deaths (n = 4,341) and case-
fatality rate (%) by year.
Figure 2. Monthly distribution of probable and confirmed human 
anthrax cases, China, 1955–2014.
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Fujian (1981), Zhejiang (1990), Jiangxi (1996), and Guang-
dong (1998), gradually stopped reporting human anthrax. 
In addition, cases were rarely reported in southeastern Chi-
na (Figure 3).
The cumulative number of counties affected by proba-
ble or confirmed human anthrax continued to increase from 
188 (6.1% of the 3,074 counties in China) in 2005 to 358 
(11.6%) in 2014. During the same period, although 52–88 
previously affected counties reported new probable or con-
firmed human anthrax cases every year, newly affected 
counties were continuously reported (range 6–71 cases 
each year) (Figure 4). In contrast, the number of counties 
reporting confirmed human anthrax cases was much smaller 
compared with the number of counties affected by probable 
and confirmed cases. However, the pattern was similar and 
the cumulative number of affected counties with confirmed 
human anthrax increased from 41 in 2005 to 104 in 2014 
(online Technical Appendix Figure 1).
The counties affected by probable and confirmed hu-
man anthrax were located mainly in southwestern and 
northeastern China. Most newly affected counties were ad-
jacent to previously affected counties. However, there were 
also newly affected counties not adjacent to previously af-
fected counties in eastern China, such as counties in Shan-
dong, Jiangsu, and Hunan Provinces (Figure 5). The pattern 
of geographic distribution in affected counties was similar 
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Figure 3. Provincial 
distribution of probable and 
confirmed human anthrax 
cases, China, 1955–2014.
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when only confirmed human anthrax cases were included 
in the analysis, except that there were fewer counties with 
confirmed cases (online Technical Appendix Figure 2).
Demographic Characteristics
During 2005–2014, a total of 86.7% of human anthrax cases 
were found in farmers and herdsmen. Rural cases accounted 
for 92.4% of all cases (Table). The overall male:female case 
ratio was 2.8:1, and there was no obvious changing trend 
during this period. The proportion of urban cases fluctuated 
around 7%, except for 15% in 2011. In rural areas, younger 
persons, usually men <34 years of age, were more common-
ly affected. In urban areas, persons >40 years of age were 
more commonly affected. For affected persons <1–14 and 
>65 y of age, cases were more common in female patients 
than in male patients (online Technical Appendix Figure 3).
Diagnostics
During 2005–2014, a total of 3,379 human anthrax cases 
were reported, of which 257 (7.6%) were confirmed cases 
(Table). The proportion of confirmed cases fluctuated over 
this period, ranging from 4.8% in 2009 to 11.7% in 2014, 
and also varied between provinces; the highest was 36.4% 
in Shanxi and 29.5% in Inner Mongolia, and the lowest was 
0% in Jiangsu, Shandong, and Hunan (online Technical 
Appendix Figures 4, 5). During the same period, 97.7% of 
national probable and confirmed cases were cutaneous an-
thrax, which also accounted for most anthrax cases across 
all provinces (online Technical Appendix Figure 6).
A total of 41 deaths were caused by anthrax; the propor-
tion of fatal cases was 1.9% for confirmed cases and 1.2% 
for probable cases. The median time from illness onset to 
diagnosis was 4.0 days (interquartile range [IQR] 2.4–7.0 
days), from diagnosis to death, 0 days (IQR 0–1.0 days), and 
from illness onset to death, 5 days (IQR 3.0–7.0 days). The 
median time from illness onset to diagnosis was 4.0 days 
(IQR 2.0–6.7 days) for persons with probable cases and 5.0 
days (IQR 3.0–8.3 d) for persons with confirmed cases.
Discussion
We conducted a systematic study of the epidemiology 
of human anthrax in China during 1955–2014. We be-
lieve that this study was useful because of recent epi-
demiologic changes and rapid socioeconomic changes 
during the past few decades. This study showed that, 
since 1990, the incidence rate and case-fatality rate for 
human anthrax has continued to decrease; only several 
hundred cases have been reported in the past 10 years. 
Most cases were in western China and peaked in August, 
but cases were reported infrequently in eastern China. 
This study also showed that cutaneous anthrax account-
ed for 98% of cases, and the largest proportion were in 
farmers and herdsmen. A low percentage of cases were 
laboratory confirmed.
The 3 historical peaks for human anthrax all oc-
curred before 1980, after which a general decrease in 
cases occurred. Before 1980, some cases occurred in 
fur-processing workers infected by industrial exposure. 
From the 1960s onward, after implementation of strict 
quarantine and sanitary measures for animal fur and 
wool and improved industrial working conditions, the 
situation gradually improved to the point that after 1980 
almost no human anthrax cases were seen in large cit-
ies, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. Since then, 
most anthrax cases have been caused by agricultural ex-
posures. The fact that most anthrax cases were in male 
farmers or herdsmen further supports this feature of ag-
ricultural anthrax in China.
Cattle and sheep were and are the major infection 
source for human anthrax (2). The number of sheep slaugh-
tered annually in China has increased from 42.419 million 
in 1980 to 270.995 million in 2012. The number of cattle 
slaughtered annually has increased from 3.322 million in 
1980 to 48.281 million in 2013 (10).
Despite rapid increases in cattle and sheep populations, 
the case-fatality rate for human anthrax showed a continu-
ous decrease, which suggested some success in control and 
prevention of this disease in livestock. Practices contribut-
ing to this success include timely reporting and detection of 
anthrax; rapid response to outbreaks and individual cases, 
which often includes restricting movement of livestock and 
related products from affected areas, tracing previous sourc-
es of possibly infectious livestock, and accordingly alert-
ing related areas and departments; vaccination for possibly 
affected healthy livestock and related personnel, such as 
herdsmen, transportation staff, and slaughterhouse workers; 
prompt disposal of dead animals, bedding, and contaminated 
materials, for which a guide has been issued that specifies 
requirements for sites of incineration and burial of livestock 
carcasses, type of sanitizer and frequency of its use for live-
stock facilities and equipment, and general hygiene by per-
sons who have contact with diseased or dead animals (8).
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Figure 4. Trends in number of counties affected by probable and 
confirmed human anthrax, China, 2005–2014.
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However, the present pattern of human cases clearly 
shows that any further improvement can be achieved only 
by using a proactive approach to the disease in livestock. 
This approach includes annual vaccination where out-
breaks persist; improved laboratory diagnosis and partici-
pation, especially by veterinary diagnostic laboratories; 
genomic strain identification and mapping; and investi-
gation of anomalous outbreaks (e.g., anthrax is normally 
a summer disease and outbreaks at other times are more 
characteristic of contaminated livestock feed). The rea-
son for the decrease in the case-fatality rate for anthrax 
before 1980 was that this disease was largely industry re-
lated and was relatively easy to detect. With improvements 
in medical care, the incidence of anthrax showed a gen-
eral downward trend, but our study showed that, since the 
1980s, agricultural anthrax in rural areas has become a 
serious problem. Because of lack of convenient access to 
healthcare facilities and awareness of the need to seek early 
treatment for rural residence, the reported case-fatality rate 
increased and exceeded the rate during 1950s soon after 
the People’s Republic of China was established. However, 
one cannot presume that rural anthrax was absent during 
the earlier period. It is more likely that this disease was not 
reported, although cases were probably occurring at a level 
similar to that during the later period of reporting. In 1989, 
the case-fatality rate reached a high of 13.0%, which was 
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Figure 5. Geographic distribution of counties affected by probable and confirmed human anthrax, China, 2005–2014
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probably caused by a major outbreak of intestinal anthrax 
in the Changdu District of Tibet (11).
From 1990 onward, a strengthened surveillance pro-
gram was initiated in western China, and early detection 
of anthrax facilitated early treatment. This program con-
tributed to a decrease in the case-fatality rate. This rate has 
decreased to <1% in recent years, which is consistent with 
the report that the case-fatality rate for cutaneous anthrax 
is now <1% after treatment (12). However, gastrointesti-
nal anthrax has a higher risk for death, which can occur 
quickly, and this finding would preempt any clinical ob-
servations or sampling. These findings might explain the 
unusually high number of cutaneous cases relative to each 
gastrointestinal case.
Anthrax has not been eradicated from previously dis-
ease-endemic areas in China, and geographic distribution 
of the disease tends to expand into new areas. Each year, 
previously affected counties still accounted for a predomi-
nant proportion of counties with reports of cases that year. 
This finding could be caused by strong resistance of B. an-
thracis spores to environmental conditions and persistence 
of spores in old foci for disease (13). However, some prov-
inces, such as Henan, which reported many anthrax cases in 
the past, has not reported any anthrax cases for >10 years, 
shows that it is possible to control anthrax.
Conversely, newly affected counties were reported ev-
ery year during the study. Newly affected counties were 
generally adjacent to previously affected counties, which 
20 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 23, No. 1, January 2017
 
 
 
Table. Demographic and diagnostic characteristics of patients with human anthrax, by diagnosis type, China, 2005–2014* 
Characteristic Probable cases, n = 3,121 Confirmed cases, n = 258 Total, n = 3,379 
Sex     
 M 2,273 (72.8) 210 (81.4) 2,483 (73.5) 
 F 848 (27.2) 48 (18.6) 896 (26.5) 
Median age, y, (IQR) 38 (27–49) 40 (30–49) 38 (27–49) 
Age group, y    
 0–14 229 (7.3) 11 (4.3) 240 (7.1) 
 15–19 158 (5.1) 8 (3.1) 166 (4.9) 
 20–24 230 (7.4) 20 (7.8) 250 (7.4) 
 25–29 309 (9.9) 25 (9.7) 334 (9.9) 
 30–34 352 (11.3) 24 (9.3) 376 (11.1) 
 35–39 415 (13.3) 34 (13.2) 449 (13.3) 
 40–44 379 (12.1) 39 (15.1) 418 (12.4) 
 45–49 282 (9.0) 38 (14.7) 320 (9.5) 
 50–54 212 (6.8) 18 (7.0) 230 (6.8) 
 55–59 201 (6.4) 22 (8.5) 223 (6.6) 
 60–64 167 (5.4) 11 (4.3) 178 (5.3) 
 >65 187 (6.0) 8 (3.1) 195 (5.8) 
Occupation    
 Farmer or herdsman 2,700 (86.5) 231 (89.5) 2,931 (86.7) 
 Infants or students† 248 (7.9) 12 (4.7) 260 (7.7) 
 Other‡ 173 (5.5) 15 (5.8) 188 (5.6) 
Rural residence§ 2,889 (92.6) 234 (90.7) 3,123 (92.4) 
Fatal outcome 36 (1.2) 5 (1.9) 41 (1.2) 
Clinical forms    
 Cutaneous 3,055 (97.9) 252 (97.7) 3,307 (97.9) 
 Inhalational 0 1 (0.4) 1 (0.0) 
 Gastrointestinal 5 (0.2) 1 (0.4) 6 (0.2) 
 Unknown¶ 61 (2.0) 4 (1.6) 65 (1.9) 
Median onset to diagnosis interval, d (IQR) 4.0 (2.0–6.7) 5.0 (3.0–8.3) 4.0 (2.4–7.0) 
Year of illness onset    
 2005 497 (15.9) 38 (14.7) 535 (15.8) 
 2006 417 (13.4) 35 (13.6) 452 (13.4) 
 2007 400 (12.8) 26 (10.1) 426 (12.6) 
 2008 309 (9.9) 29 (11.2) 338 (10.0) 
 2009 334 (10.7) 17 (6.6) 351 (10.4) 
 2010 265 (8.5) 25 (9.7) 290 (8.6) 
 2011 279 (8.9) 30 (11.6) 309 (9.1) 
 2012 220 (7.1) 17 (6.6) 237 (7.0) 
 2013 181 (5.8) 12 (4.7) 193 (5.7) 
 2014  219 (7.0) 29 (11.2) 248 (7.3) 
*Values are no. (%) unless otherwise indicated. Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding. IQR, interquartile range. 
†Infants include children attending and not attending kindergarten. Students include primary, secondary, and college students. 
‡Includes teacher, laborers, self-employed and unemployed, workers, food industry personnel, retired persons, and cadres of staff. 
§If the residence community was connected to seats of county or municipal government through public facilities, residence facilities and other facilities, or 
mine area, development zone, research institutes, higher education establishments, farming communities or tree farming communities with >3,000 of 
permanent residents, it was considered an urban residence. Otherwise, the community was considered a rural residence. 
¶No information was available. 
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indicated a higher risk for importing anthrax from neigh-
boring disease-endemic counties through contaminated 
livestock feed or movement of animals with latent infec-
tions. However, a few counties in Hunan and Jiangsu Prov-
inces in eastern China, which are not near disease-endemic 
areas, also became newly affected in recent years. Inves-
tigations of these incidents showed that they were caused 
by long-distance transportation of infected livestock from 
disease-endemic areas. These investigations indicated the 
need for livestock inspection and ensuring that such live-
stock have been vaccinated >7–10 days before shipment.
As disease control improves, disease reporting also 
improves, and cases that would have been missed are now 
detected and reported. However, absence of disease reports 
is not the same as absence of disease. This situation indi-
cates that provinces and large cities that have not had any 
anthrax cases in recent years are at risk for reemergence of 
anthrax. Humans get infected from animals with anthrax, 
and not vice versa. Therefore, humans will only be safe 
from this disease when it has been eradicated from live-
stock. Although eradication will require diligent surveil-
lance and monitoring by the agricultural and veterinary 
communities, it has been achieved in many countries (5).
Our study had 2 limitations. First, we used data ob-
tained through a passive surveillance system that was based 
on human health facilities nationwide. Thus, disease bur-
den was probably underestimated because of various rea-
sons, such as not seeking medical care. However, the clini-
cal presentation for cutaneous anthrax makes patients more 
likely to seek medical care. Second, probable cases without 
laboratory confirmation of infection are also included in 
the analysis. Most cases were cutaneous, and their clinical 
manifestations are easily identified by medical personnel.
Laboratory diagnosis (based on isolation of B. anthracis) 
is not completely reliable. However, B. anthracis is suscepti-
ble to many antimicrobial drugs, and treatment of this type is 
commonly used. Such treatment could result in lesions being 
negative for B. anthracis. Although in recent years ELISA 
and PCR could be used for diagnosing confirmed cases, both 
techniques were rarely used at the local level because there 
were no reliable commercial kits for detecting antibodies 
against B. anthracis and no unified standard procedure for 
PCR of B. anthracis is currently available.
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